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1. Introduction 
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 is generally believed not to 
have had a large impact on the Union‟s Common Foreign and Security Policy. In fact, most 
commentators would argue that the „second pillar‟ remained in place.1 The place of CFSP as 
the only policy area in a separate treaty (the TEU), even distinct from all other rules on 
external relations (in the TFEU) indeed supports this view. In addition, the treaty itself makes 
quite clear that “The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and 
procedures” (Art. 24.1 TEU). Hence, at first sight, CFSP maintained the „intergovernmental‟ 
nature that it, allegedly, had when in was established in 1992.
2
 
 However, over the past years research revealed that these days CFSP is clearly 
different from the policy that was created twenty years ago.
3
 The legal order of the European 
Union proved to have its own dynamics, which resulted in an increasing number of 
similarities between CFSP and the policies of the European Community.
4
 Step by step the 
subsequent treaty modifications introduced sometimes rather technical innovations, which in 
turn led to a new legal and political situation. In addition and apart from formal treaty 
changes, the CFSP legal order was affected by the case law of the European Court of Justice, 
which further defined its relation to the external relations of the Community as well as the 
                                                          
1
  Cf. Cremona 2006, as well as Cremona 2003. 
2
  At the time of the formation of the European Union it was quite common to view the non-Community parts of 
the Union as “a legal framework based on international law”. See Denza 2002, p. 5. 
3
  Obviously, the development of Europe‟s foreign and security policy goes back to the years of the European 
Political Cooperation before the CFSP, which meant that CFSP did not have to start from scratch. See for 
instance Smith 2004. 
4
  See more extensively Wessel 2007 and Wessel 2009. Compare for a political science perspective also Stetter 
2007. 
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effect of its instruments.
5
 This development was even labelled „progressive supranationalism‟ 
by one (close) observer.
6
 
The purpose of the present paper is to take a closer look at two elements in the CFSP 
decision-making procedure: the right of initiative and the voting rules. These two elements are 
generally believed to define the distinct nature of CFSP when compared to other Union 
policies. After all, both the exclusive right of initiative of the Commission and the turn to 
(ever more) qualified majority voting (QMV) belong to the „Community method‟ which over 
fifty years characterised European cooperation.
7
 By comparing the current (post-Lisbon) 
treaty provisions on the right of initiative and the voting rules with the ones in previous texts, 
we hope to be able to point to a progressive development in this area. Based on earlier 
research on the development of the CFSP legal order,
8
 our hypothesis is that the new Lisbon 
rules on the right of initiative and the voting rules shows a move towards a less 
intergovernmental CFSP, or perhaps even a „progressive supranationalism‟.9 
 Section 2 will first of all deal with the right of initiative to submit initiatives and 
proposals under the CFSP rules. This will be followed by a related issue: the right to convene 
an extraordinary Council meeting (section 3). Section 4 will deal with the basic rule of 
unanimity and the introduction of the so-called constructive abstention. The core of this issue 
is to be found in the exceptions to the unanimity rule; do we see a shift towards more QMV in 
CFSP? (section 5). Section 6, finally, will be used to draw some conclusions on the 
development of the CFSP legal regime regulating the right of initiative and the voting rules. 
 
2. The Right to Submit Initiatives or Proposals under CFSP 
2.1 From Maastricht to Nice 
The importance of the right of initiative is to be found in the fact that it defines the source of 
CFSP decisions. Ever since the Maastricht Treaty the right of initiative was above all used by 
the Presidency to initiate new CFSP decisions. Although the Presidency was not mentioned in 
the original treaty, it could base its actions on the fact that it was a Member State. The original 
Art. J.8 TEU-Maastricht listed the same provision in its paragraph 3 in the following 
wordings: 
                                                          
5
  More extensively: Hillion/Wessel 2009. See further van Ooik 2008. 
6
  See (Director of the Legal Service of the Council) Gosalbo Bono 2006, p. 349. 
7
  This is not to deny that other elements may be of equal importance, in particular the role of the European Court 
of Justice and the involvement of the European Parliament in the decision-making process. 
8
 See references in supra, note 4. 
9It goes beyond the scope of this paper to further define „intergovernmentalism‟ and „supranationalism‟. The 
bottom line, however, is that we hope to reveal a move from a „Member States driven‟ policy to a policy that is 
defined and implemented at EU level. 
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Any Member State or the Commission may refer to the Council any question 
relating to the common foreign and security policy and may submit proposals to 
the Council. 
 
The absence of an exclusive right of initiative for the Commission was one of the 
characteristics that distinguished CFSP from the Community policies. Although from the 
outset the Commission had a shared right of initiative under CFSP it has barely used it. The 
reason is that the Commission held that CFSP belonged to the Council. To quote former 
Commissioner Chris Patten: “Some of my staff […] would have preferred me to have a grab 
for foreign policy, trying to bring as much of it as possible into the orbit of the Commission. 
This always seemed to me to be wrong in principle and likely to be counterproductive in 
practice. Foreign policy should not in my view […] be treated on a par with the single market. 
It is inherently different”.10  
The original text was maintained by the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty (Art. 22 TEU-
Amsterdam) as well as by the 2001 Nice Treaty (Art. 22 TEU-Nice).  
 
2.2 From the Constitutional Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon 
The first modifications could be found in the 2005 Treaty establishing a Constitution for 
Europe, which – as is well-known – never entered into force, due to negative referenda 
outcomes in France and the Netherlands. Art. III-299.1 TCE provided the following text: 
 
Any Member State, the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, or that Minister with 
the Commission’s support, may refer any question relating to the common foreign 
and security policy to the Council and may submit to it initiatives or proposals as 
appropriate. 
 
First of all, this provision allows for initiatives or proposals to be submitted by “the Union 
Minister for Foreign Affairs”, either individually or “with the Commission‟s support”. The 
Constitutional Treaty introduced the “Union Minister for Foreign Affairs” as the successor of 
the “High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy”, introduced by the 
Amsterdam Treaty. It thus introduced a new, more supranational, element into the CFSP by 
allowing initiatives in this area to be taken by an „agent‟ of the Union, rather than just by 
                                                          
10
  See Spence 2006, p. 360. 
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Member States. By 2005 the High Representative (the Spanish politician and diplomat Javier 
Solana) had developed into a key player in CFSP, while making sure that he had the support 
of the Member States for his actions. Providing him with a formal role in the decision-making 
process could certainly be seen as an important breakthrough in the character of the Union‟s 
foreign and security policy. It is interesting to note that by using the term „Union Minister‟ the 
Constitutional Treaty went beyond the recommendations of the Convention on the Future of 
Europe. In its Final Report, Working Group VII on External Action had proposed the term 
“European External Representative”. As the report notes with obvious premonition: “Other 
titles have also been put forward in the course of discussion, notably „EU Minister of Foreign 
Affairs‟ and „EU Foreign Secretary‟. The prevailing view was that the title of „European 
External Representative‟ had the advantage of not corresponding to a title used at national 
level.”11 
 The other „supranational‟ element in this phase of the decision-making process could 
be found in the competence of the Commission. On the other hand, as we have seen, from the 
outset the Commission decided not to make use of its formal right of initiative. This is not to 
say that the Commission was not involved in CFSP. The Commission was, and still is, 
represented at all levels in the CFSP structures. Within the negotiating process in the Council, 
the Commission is a full negotiating partner as in any working party or Committee (including 
the Political and Security Committee). The President of the Commission attends European 
Council and other ad hoc meetings. The Commission is in fact the „twenty-eighth‟ Member 
State at the table. Practice thus showed an involvement of the Commission, both in the 
formulation and the implementation of CFSP Decisions, not in the least because Community 
measures were in some cases essential for an effective implementation of CFSP policy 
decisions. 
 The Constitutional Treaty deleted the individual competence of the Commission to 
submit CFSP proposals and replaced it by a possibility to submit initiatives together with the 
new Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. It thus introduced three sources for CFSP proposals 
and initiatives: the Member States, the Union Minister, and the Union Minister together with 
the Commission. We will come back to some implications of this division below. 
 The version in the TEU is similar to the one included in the Constitutional Treaty. 
Article 30.1 TEU now provides: 
 
                                                          
11
  Final report of Working Group VII on External Action, CONV 459/02 (16.12.2002), footnote 1. 
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 Any Member State, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy, or the High Representative with the Commission’ support, may 
refer any question relating to the common foreign and security policy to the 
Council and may submit to it initiatives or proposals as appropriate. 
 
 The only difference is the replacement of the term „Union Minister for Foreign Affairs‟ with 
„High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy‟. This replacement 
was caused by the changes discussed during the Lisbon IGC with the more general purpose of 
removing „state like‟ terms. At first sight, the scope of the High Representative‟s competences 
seems broader because of the extension to „security policy‟, but in fact the reason was to only 
marginally change the already existing name of the function, introduced by the TEU- 
Amsterdam (“High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy”). Although 
not explicitly mentioned in Art. 30 TEU, proposals of the High Representative may cover the 
Common Security and Defence Policy. Article 18.2 TEU explicitly provides:  
 
The High Representative shall conduct the Union’s common foreign and security 
policy. He shall contribute by his proposals to the development of that policy, 
which he shall carry out as mandated by the Council. The same shall apply to the 
common security and defence policy. 
 
 In the Lisbon-version, the Member States retained their right of initiative. Proposals to 
limit this right of Member States – for instance by allowing proposals from there or more 
Member States or to allow the European Parliament to submit proposals – were unacceptable 
to a number of Member States. 
 A proposal by the Presidium of the Convention to allow for joint proposals by the 
Commission and the High Representative was not accepted, because this would mean that the 
High Representative would need approval from the Commission for his/her proposal.
12
 A 
number of Member States were against any role of the Commission in this area.
13
 The result 
is that an active initiating role of the Commission if now formally excluded. Thus, in the 
current provision, and in line with the text of the Constitutional Treaty, the individual right of 
                                                          
12
  Draft sections of Part Three with comments, CONV 727/03 (28.05.2003), p. 51. 
13
  Amendments No. 2 (de Villepin) and No. 6 (Hain), Summary sheet of proposals for amendments concerning 
external action, including defence policy: Draft Articles for Part One, Title V (Articles 29, 30 and X), Part Two, 
Title B (Articles 1 to 36) and Chapter X (Article X) of the Constitution, CONV 707/03 (09.05.2003), p. 56. 
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initiative of the Commission disappeared. However, the possibility of a mandate from the 
Commission to the High Representative to submit a proposal may not be excluded.
14
  
 The position of the High Representative was clearly updated by the Lisbon Treaty.
15
 
The modification from „High Representative‟ to „High Representative of the Union‟ further 
underlined his role as Union actor, rather than as representative of the Member States.  
 Following the text of the Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty added the High 
Representative to the actors with a right to submit proposals. The High Representative may 
use this initiative individually or “with the Commission‟s support”. Given the position of the 
High Representative in the Commission and the clear links between the different aspects of 
EU external relations, it is difficult to see how he could initiate new CFSP in the absence of 
support by the Commission. On the other hand, the position of the High Representative is 
independent. Within the broad area of EU external relations different or even conflicting 
proposals by the Commission and the High Representative are not excluded. 
 Until the European External Action Service is fully operational,
16
 it is assumed that 
preparation of CFSP decisions takes place by the Council secretariat rather than by the 
Commission‟s DG Relex. In practice the difference between an autonomous High 
Representative initiative and one supported by the Commission will primarily have 
consequences for the way in which the proposal is prepared. Also, assumedly, it will have 
consequences for the subsequent decision-making procedure as the Commission‟s 
involvement may point to a legal basis in the TFEU. 
 Article 30 TEU mentions that apart from proposals „initiatives‟ may be submitted to 
the Council. The term already appeared in the text of the Constitutional Treaty. The difference 
between the two is not clarified by the Treaty itself. In other areas of the Union only 
„proposals‟ may be submitted (by the Commission; compare Arts. 293 and 294 TFEU). The 
reason may be that not all CFSP actions take the form of formal decisions. On the basis of 
Art. 25 TEU the Union shall conduct its CFSP not only by adopting decisions, but also by 
defining the general guidelines and by strengthening systematic cooperation between the 
Member States in the conduct of policy. The use of the term „initiative‟ in Art. 30 TEU is 
striking as one could argue that an „initiative‟ by, for instance, the High Representative, in 
most cases is not a prerequisite for the Council to adopt a decision. It may adopt decisions in 
the absence of a formal initiative being taken by the High Representative and it may also 
                                                          
14
  As argued by the Presidium of the convention; CONV 727/03 (27.05.2003), p. 51. 
15
  More extensively: Kaddous 2008, p. 206. 
16
  See on the EEAS see, for instance, Crowe 2008; Vanhoonacker/Reslow 2010; Duke 2009; Duke/Blockmans 
2010; see also the contribution of Cherubini in this volume. 
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deviate from a proposal submitted by a Member State. Only in a limited number of cases the 
Treaty seems to have foreseen a true procedural function of initiatives by the High 
Representative, in the sense that an initiative is needed for the Council to be able to act. On 
the basis of Art. 31.2 TEU the Council may act by qualified majority “on a proposal which 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy has presented 
following a specific request from the European Council” and Art. 33 TEU provides that “the 
Council may, on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy, appoint a special representative with a mandate in relation to particular 
policy issues.” 
 In addition, the Treaty refers to a number of other specific institutional issues in which 
a proposal by the High Representative seems to have a more formal role. Thus, Art. 27.3 TEU 
states that “The Council shall act on a proposal from the High Representative after consulting 
the European Parliament and after obtaining the consent of the Commission” when deciding 
on the organization and functioning of the European External Action Service; Art. 42.3 TEU 
states that “The Council shall adopt by a qualified majority, on a proposal from the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” decisions related to the 
start-up fund for expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications; 
Art. 218.3 TFEU states that “the Commission, or the High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy […] shall submit recommendations to the Council” in 
relation to the negotiation of international agreements; and Art. 329.2 TFEU states that “the 
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy […] shall give an 
opinion on whether the enhanced cooperation proposed is consistent with the Union‟s 
common foreign and security policy.” 
  
3. The Right to Convene an Extraordinary Council Meeting 
3.1 From Maastricht to Nice 
The possibility to convene an extraordinary Council meeting when it is not possible or not 
preferred to await the next regular Council meeting is closely linked to the right of initiative 
and has been part of the CFSP institutional machinery from the outset. The original Art. J.8.4 
TEU-Maastricht listed the possibility as follows: 
 
In cases requiring a rapid decision, the Presidency, of its own motion, or at the 
request of the Commission or a Member State, shall convene an extraordinary 
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Council meeting within forty-eight hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter 
period. 
 
The initiative was thus laid in the hands of the Presidency, albeit that the Commission and 
Member States could request the Presidency to convene an extra meeting. The provision 
returned in the TEU-Amsterdam in the same wordings (Art. 22.2) as well as in the TEU- Nice 
(Art. 22.2), with one minor modification (‟48 hours‟ instead of „forty-eight hours‟).  
 
 
3.2 From the Constitutional Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon 
The Constitutional Treaty moved the competence to convene an extraordinary meeting from 
the Presidency to the „Union Minister for Foreign Affairs‟ (Art. III-299 TCE), in line with the 
foreseen role of the Union Minister as president of the Foreign Affairs Council. Although 
there are good reasons to argue that the Presidency operates as a „Union actor‟ rather than as a 
Member State, the importance of this shift should not be underestimated. For the first time the 
Council could be convened on the initiative of the EU itself. 
 Following the text of the Constitutional Treaty, Art. 30.2 TEU moved the competence 
to convene an extraordinary Council meeting from the Presidency to the High Representative. 
Article 30.2 TEU now states: 
 
In cases requiring a rapid decision, the High Representative, of his own motion, 
or at the request of a Member State, shall convene an extraordinary Council 
meeting within 48 hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter period. 
 
It is interesting to note that the possibility for the Commission to request an extraordinary 
meeting was deleted. Taken together with the removal of the individual right of initiative of 
the Commission under CFSP (supra) this underlines the upgraded position of the High 
Representative, but at the cost of the Commission. Member States still have a possibility to 
request the High Representative to convene an extraordinary emergency meeting. 
 
4. Unanimity and Constructive Abstention 
4.1  From Maastricht to Nice 
The unanimity rule is at the heart of the „intergovernmental‟ image of CFSP. Indeed, it is safe 
to assume that the inclusion of CFSP in the Maastricht Treaty was possible only because of 
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the absence of majority voting, or more generally: the inapplicability of the „Community 
method‟. The original Art. J.8.2 TEU-Maastricht stated: 
 
[...] The Council shall act unanimously, except for procedural questions and in 
the case referred to in Article J.3(2). 
 
This is not to say that majority voting has not been debated. The Rome II European Council 
meeting in 1990 decided on the wish to include a provision which would make decision-
making possible, despite the non-participation or abstention of some Member States.
17
 
However, this idea did not lead to a reference to the provision on QMV in the EC Treaty, but 
to a Declaration (No. 27), adopted by the IGC, providing that “with regard to Council 
decisions requiring unanimity, Member States will, to the extent possible, avoid preventing a 
unanimous decision where a qualified majority exists in favour of that decision”.18 Member 
States under the Maastricht provisions indeed seemed to have an obligation to explain why 
the use of a qualified majority would not be possible in a certain case, but the Declaration 
could never be used to overrule the provision in Art. J.8 TEU-Maastricht. Nevertheless, it is 
generally assumed that the possibility of QMV has never been used in practice and that 
unanimity was at the basis of the cooperation. 
The slow progress of CFSP in the early days was partly blamed on the fact that 
because of the unanimity rule the entire decision-making process could be hijacked by one 
individual Member State. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty therefore introduced the possibility of 
abstentions. Article 23.1 TEU-Amsterdam stated: 
 
Decisions under this Title shall be taken by the Council acting unanimously. 
Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the 
adoption of such decisions. 
 
This was the general rule: decisions could (and can) be adopted when there are no „No‟ votes. 
Article 23 TEU-Amsterdam also introduced a different possibility to prevent Member States 
from being bound by the decision: 
 
                                                          
17
 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Rome, 1990. 
18
 A similar provision was already included in the Single European Act, Article 30, paragraph 3(c). It is striking 
that this provision was „reduced‟ to a Declaration. 
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When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention 
by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it 
shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision 
commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned 
shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based 
on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the 
members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent more 
than one third of the votes weighted in accordance with Article 148(2) of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community, the decision shall not be adopted. 
 
At first sight this opened the possibility of so-called “coalitions of the able and willing”; 
CFSP actions no longer depended on the approval and implementation of all Member States, 
the more flexible approach allowed for smaller groups of states to engage in a certain action 
or to adopt a position. On closer inspection, however, non-participation through the issuing of 
a formal declaration did not at all deprive the abstaining Council member from obligations 
based on the adopted decision. After all, the decision taken by the Council remains a „Union 
decision‟. While the abstaining state may not be asked to actively implement this decision, it 
had to accept that „the decision commits the Union‟. 
This is underlined by the rule that “in a spirit of mutual solidarity, the member state 
concerned shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based 
on that decision”. The wording of this provision closely resembles that in the general loyalty 
clause, which at the time could be found in Art. 11.2 TEU-Amsterdam: “[the Member States] 
shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair 
its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations” (the loyalty obligation can 
currently be found in Art. 24.3 TEU-Lisbon in a slightly different wording). Indeed, both 
provisions seriously limited the freedom of Member States, even in the case where a formal 
declaration of abstention has been issued. No national action that could possibly conflict with 
or impede Union action was allowed. From the outset this limited the advantage of the option 
of abstention to cases in which the Member State had little or no interest and indeed no plans 
for an individual national policy. Moreover, the declarations of dissent could even seriously 
undermine the effectiveness of CFSP decisions in relation to third states. This is the reason 
why the option of „constructive abstention‟ in Art. 23 TEU-Amsterdam was sometimes 
referred to as „destructive abstention‟. It is acknowledged that this, indeed, took away much 
of the rationale of the declaration of abstention. 
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Nevertheless, the possibility of constructive abstention returned in the 2001 Nice 
Treaty. In addition, Art. 23 TEU-Nice brought an end to all possible speculations as to 
whether abstentions can or cannot block a decision by stipulating that “[a]bstentions by 
members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption of such decisions”. 
This implied that in that case a decision could be taken. However, there seemed to be no 
legally relevant advantage in using this opportunity, since it followed from the text of this 
provision that the abstaining Member State(s) would nonetheless be bound by the adopted 
decision. 
 
 
4.2 From the Constitutional Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon 
The 2005 Constitutional Treaty maintained both the unanimity and the abstention rules in 
Art. III-300.3 TCE with minor changes in terminology only. The general rule that 
“Abstentions by members present in person or represented shall not prevent the adoption by 
the Council of acts which require unanimity” was no longer referred to in the CFSP 
provisions, but returned in Art. III-343.3 TCE. In turn, the Lisbon Treaty adopted the text of 
the Constitutional Treaty in its Art. 31.1 TEU: 
  
Decisions under this Chapter shall be taken by the European Council and the 
Council acting unanimously, except where this Chapter provides otherwise. The 
adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded. 
When abstaining in a vote, any member of the Council may qualify its abstention 
by making a formal declaration under the present subparagraph. In that case, it 
shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision 
commits the Union. In a spirit of mutual solidarity, the Member State concerned 
shall refrain from any action likely to conflict with or impede Union action based 
on that decision and the other Member States shall respect its position. If the 
members of the Council qualifying their abstention in this way represent at least 
one third of the Member States comprising at least one third of the population of 
the Union, the decision shall not be adopted. 
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Thus unanimity is still the rule, which stands in stark contrast to the other EU policies where 
QMV has been established as the default voting rule. German and French proposals to make 
QMV the default option did not make it.
19
 
 A novel element in this provision is the explicit exclusion of the adoption of 
„legislative acts‟. If anything, this element clearly distinguishes CFSP from the other Union 
policy areas. The Constitutional Treaty already excluded “European laws and framework 
laws” from the instruments to be used for CFSP, which could only be shaped on the basis of 
“European decisions” (Art. I-40.6 TCE). The exclusion of „legislative acts‟ in Art. 31.1 TEU 
is confirmed by Art. 24.1 TEU: 
 
[…]The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and 
procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the 
Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The 
adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded.[…] 
 
The CFSP instrument is therefore the „Decision‟ (compare Art. 25.1 TEU), which should not 
be confused with the „Decision‟ used in other policy areas. This latter type of „Decision‟ is 
still one of the key legal acts of the Union and is described in Art. 288 TFEU (“A decision 
shall be binding in its entirety. A decision which specifies those to whom it is addressed shall 
be binding only on them.”). The exclusion of the adoption of legislative acts does not deprive 
the CFSP Decisions of their legal nature. Their binding nature is confirmed by Art. 28.2 TEU 
(“Decisions referred to in paragraph 1 shall commit the Member States in the positions they 
adopt and in the conduct of their activity.”) In fact, the exclusion of legislative acts primarily 
has to do with the exclusion of the legislative procedure and hence with the inapplicability of 
the role of the Commission and the European Parliament in this procedure. 
 As in the pre-Lisbon TEU, abstentions do not prevent the adoption of decisions, unless 
the number of Member States qualifying their abstention by issuing a formal declaration 
represent at least one third of the Member States comprising at least one third of the 
population of the Union. The phrasing of these criteria deviates somewhat from the pre-
Lisbon text, which referred to more than one third of the votes weighted according to the 
QMV rules. The new rule can be explained on the basis of the changed QMV rules, although 
there does not seem to be an exception for the period until 2014. The general rationale of this 
                                                          
19
  Amendments No. 6 (de Villepin) and No. 10 (Fischer), CONV 707/03 (09.05.2003), p. 60. 
 - 13 - 
rule is clear: it is difficult to maintain a CFSP Decision once it is not supported by the vast 
majority of the Member States (including the larger ones). 
 Article 31.1 TEU does, however, introduce a novelty in relation to the actors involved 
in decision-making. The explicit competence of the European Council to adopt CFSP 
decisions is new, although the pre-Lisbon TEU already allowed for the European Council to 
adopt „Common Strategies‟. The new competences in Art. 31 TEU should be seen in the 
context of Art. 22 TEU, which allows for the European Council to “identify the strategic 
interests and objectives of the Union.” That article furthermore provides that: 
 
Decisions of the European Council on the strategic interests and objectives of the 
Union shall relate to the common foreign and security policy and to other areas of 
the external action of the Union. Such decisions may concern the relations of the 
Union with a specific country or region or may be thematic in approach. They 
shall define their duration, and the means to be made available by the Union and 
the Member States. 
 
In addition Art. 26.1 TEU provides: 
 
The European Council shall identify the Union’s strategic interests, determine the 
objectives of and define general guidelines for the common foreign and security 
policy, including for matters with defence implications. It shall adopt the 
necessary decisions. 
 
The last sentence in the Article seems to imply that the „general guidelines‟ are not to be seen 
as „decisions‟. The practical relevance of that distinction is not clear, apart from the obvious 
fact that guidelines may not be adopted on the basis of QMV (see below). They do seem to be 
binding on the Member States as the loyalty obligation in Art. 24.3 TEU is not limited to 
„Decisions‟. On the other hand, they do not seem to be able to function as a source of QMV in 
the Council, as Art. 31.2 TEU only refers to „a decision of the European Council‟. 
 
5.  Towards Qualified Majority Voting in CFSP? 
5.1 From Maastricht to Nice 
The debate on majority voting has been present in CFSP negotiations from the outset. An 
early compromise was found in Declaration No. 27, adopted by the Maastricht IGC, providing 
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that “with regard to Council decisions requiring unanimity, Member States will, to the extent 
possible, avoid preventing a unanimous decision where a qualified majority exists in favour of 
that decision” (see supra). At the same time QMV was never completely ruled out. An 
explicit possibility was already included in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. “The case referred to 
in Article J.3(2)” was mentioned in Art. J.8 TEU-Maastricht as one of the exceptions to the 
general rule that “the Council shall act unanimously”. Article J.3.2 TEU-Maastricht indeed 
ordered the Council to define the matters on which decisions were to be taken by qualified 
majority when it adopted a Joint Action and during the further development of the Joint 
Action. Nevertheless, the decision to adopt a Joint Action remained subject to the rule of 
unanimity. When the Council would make use of this possibility, the votes of its members 
would have to be weighted in accordance with the Community procedures on QMV. 
However, the rare attempts to introduce majority voting in particular decision-making 
procedures were supposedly blocked by the British, which made others reluctant to make 
further proposals to that end.
20
 
An important step was taken in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty. Whereas the 1992 Treaty 
limited QMV to the implementation of Joint Actions (and only after a unanimous decision to 
that end had been taken), the new Art. 23.2 TEU-Amsterdam called for QMV by the Council 
when it adopts Joint Actions, Common Positions or other Decisions on the basis of a 
European Council Common Strategy, or when it adopts a decision implementing a previously 
adopted Joint Action or Common Position. Art. 23.2 TEU-Amsterdam thus read: 
 
By derogation from the provisions of paragraph 1, the Council shall act by 
qualified majority: 
- when adopting joint actions, common positions or taking any other decision on 
the basis of a common strategy; 
- when adopting any decision implementing a joint action or a common position. 
 
In addition, a Council member could still declare that, for important and stated reasons of 
national policy, it intended to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified 
majority, in which case a vote would not be taken (Art. 23.2, part 2 TEU-Amsterdam). Since 
„important‟ was not defined by the Treaty, this provision provided opportunities for Member 
States to block Council decision-making. A way out of this was offered by the provision that 
in that event, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that the matter be 
                                                          
20
  Keukeleire 1998, p. 291. 
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referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity. While the Heads of State and 
Government may indeed be able to settle the issue in connection with other agenda items, it is 
obvious that this provision put the possibility of QMV into perspective. 
 The Amsterdam TEU provided that the votes of the members of the Council shall be 
weighted in accordance with the Community rules and that “[f]or their adoption, decisions 
shall require at least 62 votes in favour, cast by at least 10 members.” At the same time, it 
made clear that QMV could never be used for the adoption of “decisions having military or 
defence implications” (par. 2; see further below). 
 Irrespective of the fact that the Council continued to strive for consensus, the 2001 
Nice Treaty maintained the possibility of QMV. In Art. 23.2 TEU-Nice it even added a third 
possibility to the two introduced by the Amsterdam TEU. Apart from decisions based on a 
European Council Common Strategy and implementing decisions, QMV could also be used 
“when appointing a special representative in accordance with Article 18(5).” 
QMV continued to be based on the Community rules, but the Nice Treaty somewhat 
tightened the rules with a view to ensuring that adopted CFSP decisions would enjoy 
sufficient support by the (larger) Member States: 
 
For their adoption, decisions shall require at least 232 votes in favour cast by at 
least two thirds of the members. When a decision is to be adopted by the Council 
by a qualified majority, a member of the Council may request verification that the 
Member States constituting the qualified majority represent at least 62% of the 
total population of the Union. If that condition is shown not to have been met, the 
decision in question shall not be adopted.  
 
A completely different opportunity for the Council to escape unanimity is when the question 
is „procedural‟, in which case the Council shall act by a majority of its members. 
Article J.8.2 TEU-Maastricht already included this exception: 
 
[...] The Council shall act unanimously, except for procedural questions [...]. 
 
Nowhere in Art. J.8 TEU-Maastricht, nor in any other part of the Treaty were these 
„procedural questions‟ further defined or was the procedure for their adoption provided. The 
only possible conclusion on the basis of Art. J.8 TEU-Maastricht was that they need not be 
adopted unanimously. Hence, one could argue that a simple majority would be sufficient. 
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However, the conclusion that the adoption of procedural questions was subject to the rules 
governing QMV was more in line with the context of the CFSP Title in the Maastricht TEU, 
in which the only other exception to the unanimity rule was dealt with by QMV as well. 
 The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty settled the question on what kind of majority should be 
used to decide on procedural questions in its Art. 23.3 TEU-Amsterdam: 
 
For procedural questions, the Council shall act by a majority of its members. 
 
This text returned in the 2001 Nice version in exactly the same wording (Art. 23.3 TEU-
Nice). 
 
Finally, one issue area still managed to escape from QMV: decisions having military or 
defence implications continue to be taken on the basis of unanimity. The Maastricht Treaty 
allowed for the possibility that the Council decide on an ad hoc basis that implementation of a 
particular decision could take place on the basis of QMV (see above). Ironically, this option 
was used for a decision which obviously had defence implications (a Joint Action on anti-
personnel mines).
21
 Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, in which the structural possibility of 
QMV was introduced, the treaties have excluded “decisions having military or defence 
implications” from decision-making by QMV (see Art. 23.2 TEU-Amsterdam and TEU-Nice: 
“This paragraph shall not apply to decisions having military or defence implications”). 
 
5.2 From the Constitutional Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon 
At the time of the Convention for Europe which was to prepare the IGC on the 2005 
Constitutional Treaty, it became clear that a „communautarisation‟ of CFSP would meet 
strong resistance from some larger Member States (led by the United Kingdom). It became 
obvious that CFSP would maintain a somewhat distinct position in the Treaty, despite the fact 
that a preference for more QMV was expressed by Working Group VII on External Action. In 
its final report this Working Group argued the following in relation to decision-making in 
CFSP:
22
 
 
                                                          
21
 Council Decision 95/170/CFSP concerning the joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 
of the Treaty on European Union on anti- personnel mines, O.J. L 115/1 (1995) Article 6, paragraph 3. 
22
  CONV 459/02 (16.12.2002), point 8. 
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“– The Working Group underlines that, in order to avoid CFSP inertia and encourage a pro-
active CFSP, maximum use should be made of existing provisions for the use of QMV, and of 
provisions allowing for some form of flexibility, such as constructive abstention. 
– In addition, the Working Group recommends that a new provision be inserted in the Treaty, 
which would provide for the possibility of the European Council agreeing by unanimity to 
extend the use of QMV in the field of CFSP; 
– Several members consider that „joint initiatives‟ should be approved by QMV.” 
 
Article III-300.1 TCE nevertheless maintained the „unanimity rule (“The European decisions 
referred to in this Chapter shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously”). 
 Article III-300.2 TCE listed four exceptions to the unanimity rule. Three situations in 
which QMV could be used where already part of the Amsterdam regime (albeit perhaps in a 
somewhat modified language): 
 
(a) when adopting European decisions defining a Union action or position on the 
basis of a European decision of the European Council relating to the Union's 
strategic interests and objectives, as referred to in Article III-293(1); 
 
In line with the overall use of the term „European decisions‟ for all CFSP legal acts, in this 
provision the Common Strategies of the European Council were replaced by „European 
decisions of the European Council relating to the Union‟s strategic interests and objectives‟. 
 
(c) when adopting a European decision implementing a European decision 
defining a Union action or position; 
(d) when adopting a European decision concerning the appointment of a special 
representative in accordance with Article III-302. 
 
One situation was new: 
 
(b) when adopting a European decision defining a Union action or position, on a 
proposal which the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs has presented following a 
specific request to him or her from the European Council, made on its own 
initiative or that of the Minister; 
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This could certainly be seen as a major step. The Constitutional Treaty thus allowed for the 
Council to adopt CFSP decisions by QMV once these decisions were based on a proposal by 
the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. At the same time the compromise is clearly visible in 
this provision: at the level of the European Council all Member States would have the 
possibility to block a request to the Union Minister to submit a proposal. 
In a different part of the Constitutional Treaty one comes across an additional 
exception to the unanimity rule. Article III-313.3 TCE regulated the setting-up and financing 
of a start-up fund for expenditure arising from operations having military or defence 
implications. Article III-311.2 TCE allows for QMV to be used in relation to the 
establishment of the European Defence Agency; and Art. III-312 TCE mentions QMV in 
relation to some decisions taken with regard to the Permanent Structured Cooperation in the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (see further below). 
 All in all, the Constitutional Treaty thus substantively extended the possibilities for 
QMV in the CFSP area. At the same time, however, the possibility introduced by the 
Amsterdam Treaty to allow Member States to block the possibility of QMV returned in 
Art. III-300.2 TCE: 
 
If a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national 
policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a European decision to be adopted by 
a qualified majority, a vote shall not be taken. The Union Minister for Foreign 
Affairs will, in close consultation with the Member State involved, search for a 
solution acceptable to it. If he or she does not succeed, the Council may, acting by 
a qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council 
for a European decision by unanimity. 
 
Note that the „important and stated reasons‟ where replaced by „vital and stated reasons‟, by 
which – at least on paper – the possibility to oppose QMV was further restricted. At the same 
time, the Constitutional Treaty introduced the possibility of the Union Minister for Foreign 
Affairs to act as a broker and to try and solve the issue at the level of the Council. 
 
The 2007 Lisbon Treaty largely followed the text of the Constitutional Treaty, albeit that the 
terminology has been adapted to the new „Lisbon language‟ („Decision‟ instead of „European 
decision‟, „High Representative‟ instead of „Union Minister‟). Article 31.2 TEU thus lists the 
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possibilities for QMV in the area of CFSP, and can hence be seen as providing the exceptions 
to the general rule of unanimity: 
 
– when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a 
decision of the European Council relating to the Union's strategic interests and 
objectives, as referred to in Article 22(1), 
– when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position, on a proposal 
which the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy has presented following a specific request from the European Council, 
made on its own initiative or that of the High Representative, 
– when adopting any decision implementing a decision defining a Union action or 
position, 
– when appointing a special representative in accordance with Article 33. 
 
In addition the use of QMV is possible in a limited number of other cases, which are to be 
found in other parts of the Treaty. First of all the use of QMV for the establishment and 
financing of a start-up fund for military and defence operations was taken over from the 
Constitutional Treaty. This possibility is now mentioned in Art. 41.3 TEU: 
 
The Council shall adopt by a qualified majority, on a proposal from the High 
Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, decisions establishing: 
(a) the procedures for setting up and financing the start-up fund, in particular the 
amounts allocated to the fund; 
(b) the procedures for administering the start-up fund; 
(c) the financial control procedures. 
 
Secondly, one comes across QMV in Art. 45.2 TEU in relation to the establishment of the 
European Defence Agency: 
 
The European Defence Agency shall be open to all Member States wishing to be 
part of it. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt a decision 
defining the Agency’s statute, seat and operational rules. 
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And finally, some decisions in relation to the Permanent Structured Cooperation in the 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) may be taken by QMV. With regard to 
notification by Member States which wish to participate in the Permanent Structured 
Cooperation, Art. 46.2 TEU states: 
 
Within three months following the notification […] the Council shall adopt a 
decision establishing permanent structured cooperation and determining the list 
of participating Member States. The Council shall act by a qualified majority 
after consulting the High Representative. 
 
Later accession to the Permanent Structured Cooperation is also decided on by QMV 
(Art. 46.3 TEU): 
 
Any Member State which, at a later stage, wishes to participate in the permanent 
structured  cooperation shall notify its intention to the Council and to the High 
Representative. 
[…] The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the High 
Representative. Only members of the Council representing the participating 
Member States shall take part in the vote. 
 
Similarly, suspension of a Member State from the Permanent Structured Cooperation may be 
decided upon by the Council on the basis of QMV (Art. 46.4 TEU): 
 
If a participating Member State no longer fulfils the criteria or is no longer able 
to meet the commitments […], the Council may adopt a decision suspending the 
participation of the Member State concerned. 
The Council shall act by a qualified majority. Only members of the Council 
representing the participating Member States, with the exception of the Member 
State in question, shall take part in the vote. 
 
As a counter-weight to all these new exceptions to the unanimity rule, the Treaty maintained 
the „emergency brake‟ for situations in which a member of the Council declares that, for vital 
(the term was already introduced by the Constitutional Treaty) and stated reasons of national 
policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by QMV. In that case the 
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High Representative will first search for a solution, before the Council may, acting by a 
qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for a decision 
by unanimity. In line with the text of the Constitutional Treaty, the High Representative may 
thus act as a broker to reach a compromise at the level of the Council. The opposing Member 
State is just been given a choice: either accept decision-making by QMV (which will only be 
realistic once the draft decision takes the objections raised by the Member State into account), 
or move the issue to the level of the European Council (where the Member State would have 
the possibility to block the decision, or to link it to other strategic issues). 
 With regard to the question of using QMV for procedural questions, it is interesting to 
note that the specific CFSP provision had disappeared in the 2005 Constitutional Treaty. A 
reference to procedural question could only be found in the general title on the Council of 
Ministers, in Art. III-344.3 TCE: 
 
The Council shall act by a simple majority regarding procedural matters and for 
the adoption of its Rules of Procedure 
 
Post-Lisbon not only this provision returns (in Art. 240.3 TFEU), but also the old Nice 
provision in relation to the specific CFSP voting-rules: “For procedural questions, the Council 
shall act by a majority of its members.” 
 At the same time this is the only situation in CFSP where neither unanimity nor QMV 
is used, but where decisions are being taken by a simple majority. The fact that the adjective 
„simple‟ is left out does not seem to cause problems of interpretation. After all, in any other 
case the text of the Treaty refers to qualified majority voting. A question that has been left 
open concerns the definition of „procedural questions‟. They are not defined in the Treaties, 
nor in the Council‟s Rules of Procedure.23 This also leaves open the question whether the 
decision to establish that a question is procedural should itself be treated as a procedural or a 
non-procedural question. In other words: the Council‟s decision to turn an issue into a 
procedural question may only be taken by a majority vote once this decision is itself 
considered procedural. It is doubtful whether the Treaty negotiators had this last possibility in 
mind. After all, acceptance of this issue being procedural would potentially open a large 
number of issues to be decided by a simple majority. 
 
                                                          
23
 Council Decision 2009/937/EU adopting the Council's Rules of Procedure, O.J. L 325/35 (2009). 
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Perhaps the most important innovation in this regard was taken by the Constitutional Treaty in 
the sense that it introduced a „dynamic‟ move to more QMV (sometimes referred to as a 
passarelle clause
24
). Article III-300.3 TCE allowed the European Council to unanimously 
adopt a European decision stipulating that the Council shall act by a qualified majority. This 
opened the way to more QMV in CFSP without formal treaty amendment. The provision was 
taken over by Art. 31.3 TEU: 
 
The European Council may unanimously adopt a decision stipulating that the 
Council shall act by a qualified majority in cases other than those referred to in 
paragraph 2. 
 
Irrespective of the fact that unanimity is still the rule in CFSP, the exceptions to the rule have 
increased over time. In addition to the specific exceptions that were introduced since the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, the Lisbon Treaty took over the more general rule from the 
Constitutional Treaty that the European Council may unanimously adopt a decision 
stipulating that the Council shall act by a qualified majority. Potentially this new QMV 
possibility allows for a more speedy process in the Council, once the European Council has 
agreed on it. However, the question remains what the actual impact will be. It may be 
assumed that this situation relates to more structural issues as the possibility to use QMV once 
a Council decision is based on a decision by the European Council is mentioned separately. 
This would mean that the European Council has been given the competence to extend the list 
of (currently) four exceptions to the unanimity rule, which would indeed resemble a true 
passarelle. Nevertheless, in some Member States (e.g. the United Kingdom and Germany), 
the government will not be able to agree to the use of this passarelle without prior approval 
by its parliament.
25
 
Finally, also in the post-Lisbon period, QMV is excluded at all times in relation to 
„decisions having military or defence implications‟ (Art. 31.4 TEU). This provision was again 
taken over from the Constitutional Treaty (Art. III-300.4 TCE), which also made sure to 
exclude the possibility that the European Council would decide on a future possibility for 
QMV in this area. The original draft of the provision did not exclude this possibility and the 
version in the Constitutional Treaty (as well as in the TEU-Lisbon) is the result of a British 
amendment to the text.
26
 
                                                          
24
 See also the contribution by Hrbek in this volume. 
25
 Piris 2010, p. 262. 
26
  Amendment No. 11 (Hain), CONV 707/03 (09.05.2003). 
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Still, the distinction between „military‟ and „defence‟ is not made clear. At the same 
time it remains striking that paragraph 4 does not simply refer to „decisions taken in the 
framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)‟, but to „decisions having 
military or defence implications‟. This could imply that also general CFSP (non CSDP) 
decisions having military or defence implications require unanimous support. This is 
underlined by the fact that this rule is mentioned under the CFSP voting modalities, rather 
than merely in the CSDP Title. In practice this would imply that general CFSP (non-CSDP) 
decisions (for instance on humanitarian assistance) would require unanimity in all phases 
when they would have military or defence implications. How to decide on the nature of the 
decisions (and hence on the applicable voting procedure) is not regulated by the Treaty, but 
one may assume that in these cases Member States may fall back on the general possibility to 
block QMV in cases of “vital  and stated reasons of national policy” (see above). 
 
6. Concluding Observations 
The purpose of this paper was to establish whether – and to which extend – the Lisbon Treaty 
could be seen as another step in the development of the CFSP with a view to two main 
elements: the right of initiative and the voting rules. Based on earlier research on the 
development of the CFSP legal order, the hypothesis was that the new Lisbon rules would 
show a move towards a less intergovernmental CFSP. 
 In historical perspective a development is indeed undeniable, but the finally emerging 
picture is, at best, mixed. Indeed the inclusion of CFSP, together with all other Union policies 
in one „Constitutional Treaty‟ in 2005 seemed to make an end to the specific nature of CFSP. 
In addition, the Constitutional Treaty introduced the “Union Minister for Foreign Affairs” – 
modified by the Lisbon Treaty to „High Representative of the Union‟ – as the successor to the 
“High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy”. Thus a new, more 
supranational, element into the CFSP by allowing initiatives in this area to be taken by an 
„agent‟ of the Union, rather than just by Member States. Similarly, the competence to convene 
an extraordinary meeting was moved from the Presidency to the High Representative, which 
implied that for the first time the Council could be convened on the initiative of the EU itself. 
 Also with regard to the voting rules, some major steps have been taken over time. The 
introduction of „constructive abstention‟ by the Amsterdam Treaty was maintained by later 
treaty modifications. Together with the fact that non-participation by a Member State through 
the issuing of a formal declaration did not at all deprive this abstaining Council member from 
obligations based on the adopted decision, the procedure in practice comes closes to QMV. 
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After all, the decision taken by the Council remains a „Union decision‟. While the abstaining 
state may not be asked to actively implement this decision, it has to accept that „the decision 
commits the Union‟. In addition both the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon 
extended the possibilities for QMV. The most important innovation in this regard may very 
well be the introduction of the passarelle clause, which allows the European Council to 
unanimously adopt a decision stipulating that the Council shall act by a qualified majority. 
This opened the way to more QMV in CFSP without formal treaty amendment. Finally, it is 
worth noting that the „important and stated reasons‟ which could be invoked by Member 
States wishing to block QMV where replaced by „vital and stated reasons‟, by which – at least 
on paper – the possibility to oppose QMV was further restricted. 
At the same time, during the Convention for Europe which was to prepare the IGC on the 
2005 Constitutional Treaty it became clear that a „communautarisation‟ of CFSP would be 
met by strong resistance from some larger Member States. The final text of the Constitutional 
Treaty, which largely returned in the Treaty of Lisbon, therefore even maintained many of the 
specific characteristic of CFSP and even introduced a few new ones. First of all the individual 
competence of the Commission to submit proposals (one of the crown jewels of the 
„Community method‟) has been deleted and replaced by a possibility to submit initiatives 
together with the new Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. Even a proposal by the Presidium 
of the Convention to allow for joint proposals by the Commission and the High 
Representative was not accepted, because this would mean that the High Representative 
would need approval from the Commission for his proposal. In addition the term „Union 
Minister for Foreign Affairs‟ in the Constitutional Treaty was replaced with „High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy‟. This replacement was 
caused by the changes discussed during the Lisbon IGC with the more general purpose of 
removing „state like‟ terms. Also, proposals to limit the right of initiative of individual 
Member States  were unacceptable to a number of them. 
Thus unanimity is still the rule, which stands in stark contrast to the other EU policies 
where since „Lisbon‟ QMV has been established as the default voting rule. German and 
French proposals to make QMV the default option for CFSP did not make it. Still, as a 
counter-weight to the new exceptions to the unanimity rule that did make it to the final text, 
the Treaty maintained the „emergency brake‟ for situations in which a member of the Council 
declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national policy, it intends to oppose the adoption 
of a decision to be taken by QMV. Finally, the explicit exclusion of the adoption of 
 - 25 - 
„legislative acts‟ reveals that, despite the binding nature of its decisions,  CFSP remains the 
odd one out in terms of the role of the European Parliament and the Court of Justice. 
Even on balance, it is difficult to assess the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the rules on 
the right of initiative and voting in CFSP.  The new rules have come a long way since 
Maastricht and a development is clearly visible. However, the Treaty introduced both a 
number of „intergovernmental‟ elements and some innovations that may potentially change 
the nature of CFSP. It seems to be up to the dynamics of the process itself to use the latter to 
make full use of the innovations in practice. 
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